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Abstract 
The paper argues that the contrast between studies of MNCs which emphasise 
isomorphism and those which emphasise social embeddedness is unhelpful. Following 
recent institutionalist discussions which have emphasised the dynamic nature of firms, 
and institutions, it is argued that the transnational social space of the multinational 
encompasses a variety of different forms of actors which are engaged in processes that 
partially produce isomorphism and partially reproduce institutional difference. This 
perspective is proposed not as a middle way between the two institutionalisms but as a 
way to capture the ongoing dynamics of MNCs. The paper illustrates this approach 
through considering four ideal-typical ‘games’ which occur inside MNCs. These games 
are analysed in terms of the actors, the institutional resources brought into the game, the 
emerging rules of the game, the outcomes of the game and how these processes relate to 
institutional theory. These games reveal the complex interaction of processes of 
isomorphism and social differentiation and suggest an agenda for further research on 
MNCs that will focus on examining how these games interact and with what effect in 
different sorts of multinationals. 
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Introduction. 
 
There are many good reasons why organization theorists have been slow to empirically 
study multinationals. The difficulty in assembling data and the problem of access are 
substantial barriers in themselves. In more theoretical terms, the complexity of MNC 
organizations and the predominance of normative and rational theories in this field, that 
from the outset position multinationals as either representing the worst of contemporary 
capitalism (in terms of exploitation and inequality) or the best (in terms of efficiency 
and innovation)  (Westney and Zaheer (2001: 365) have made it difficult to create a 
framework for studying multinationals which is more distinctively based within the 
traditions of organization theory. As with other complex social phenomena common 
sense data comes in such abundance that nearly every theoretical view may be 
immediately or intuitively verified. Who would have difficulties in understanding the 
MNC as being an effective agency for mobilizing contexts to provide resources? Who 
would deny it a leading competitive position looked at from the resource-based view of 
the firm? As an ideal example for students of principal-agents relations? As a context 
for power-games and politics, coalition-making and fights over resources? Where could 
the potential for studying a learning organization and knowledge sharing be bigger? Is it 
possible to imagine other agencies in our age that play more important roles as 
producers of ideology? And do we not find evidence that they are increasingly 
becoming providers of cultural values, competing quite successfully with churches, 
universities, governments and social movements? MNCs reveal all the aspects that can 
be revealed by studying any private or public complex organization from either one or 
more of the many perspectives of organization theory, just more so. 
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 The same can be observed if we focus more narrowly on perspectives drawn from the 
diverse streams of institutional theory (Campbell, 2004). The new institutionalism in 
organization theory (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1991) would probably explain the 
multinational organizational form as an outcome of current institutional expectations 
that see globalization as important for being a modern and legitimate agency in which 
other organizations and institutions are willing to invest or employ resources. Similarly, 
the MNC can speedily spread novel organizational forms, practices and procedures, etc. 
within its boundaries by the application of the powers of the managerial hierarchy, a 
form of coercive, rather than mimetic, isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150-
4).  Thus MNCs may be seen as globally creating convergence and isomorphism faster 
and in a much more efficient way than any other social carrier has been able to do 
previously (Zucker, 1987). 
 
Against such views, researchers within the tradition of historical institutionalism, such 
as National Business Systems (NBS) (Whitley and Kristensen, 1996; Whitley, 1999) or 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), may claim two, partly contradictory, 
tendencies. The first, developed by Whitley (2001), argues that MNCs as firms build 
their managerial hierarchies, learn to exercise authority, construct markets and business 
networks, employ workers in a way that is highly influenced by distinct national 
institutions. When they go global, they will take these practised, national templates and 
routines of control and coordination with them and create subsidiaries that reflect the 
organizational forms of their home country. Thus divergence is reproduced and 
extended in the period of globalization. The second position, developed by Kristensen 
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and Zeitlin (2001; 2005), claims that because subsidiaries have been and are operating 
in distinct national settings, they will build their organizational practises on host country 
institutional foundations and will not simply reflect the home based practices of the 
multinational. Prosperous subsidiaries mobilize national institutional resources to gain 
social space, economic importance and political power within a MNC. It follows from 
this that MNCs may become a contested terrain, a transnational social space, in which 
subsidiaries fight over a multiplicity of possible future forms, directions and destinies 
for the MNC by drawing on the institutional advantages of their host location.  Once 
again, divergence is reinforced. 
 
A simplified account of these arguments might basically contrast the view that MNCs 
are carriers of processes of institutional isomorphism and globalization with the view 
that they retain strong elements of national institutional embeddedness, whether this is 
through the direction given to the firm by its home origins or through the ability of 
subsidiaries to sustain their local practices. However, in this paper, we seek to recast 
this argument in the light of more recent developments in institutional analysis. In 
particular we are referring to those approaches which are aiming to bring a more 
dynamic perspective into the relationship between institutions, actors and firms (e.g. 
Streeck and Thelen 2005; Morgan et al. 2005; Thelen 2005). The common strand which 
links these perspectives is a recognition that firms are not static recipients of  
institutional contexts but are rather involved in a complex and dynamic interaction with 
institutions at the national and international level. Thus both firms and institutions are 
continually evolving and changing in ways that go beyond simple models of ‘fit’. The 
aim of such arguments is not to return to a voluntaristic or even a contingency view of 
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the firm but rather to uncover the social processes and the social actors which give life 
and meaning to these broad categories of firms and institutions. Is it possible to carry 
these insights through into the analysis of multinationals? In this paper we seek to argue 
that it is possible to do this and furthermore by doing so, we can open up the 
institutionalist analysis of multinationals in ways that can provide rich, new insights and 
research agendas. 
 
We begin from the view that the multinational firm consists of emergent categories of 
actors that evolve through processes of mutual recognition, strategizing and organizing. 
This reflects a “network of dependencies formed by individuals” engaged in processes 
of mutual mobility or “dance” (Elias, 2000, p 482). Thus the transnational social space 
created by the MNC is a space where actors emerge through a process of identifying, 
using and reconstructing institutional resources. Thus the MNC and its connectedness to 
institutions at the global, regional, national and local levels is an evolving, shifting 
phenomena in which a range of actors and institutions are influencing this process. 
From this perspective, the dichotomy between global isomorphism and local 
institutional embeddedness is heuristically valuable but becomes a constraint once it 
becomes a template for positioning one’s view of social reality. In what follows, we 
instead explore the interaction between isomorphism and embeddedness through 
considering in depth what we call four ideal-typical games that are being played in 
multinationals in the current period. In these games, we explore how different types of 
actors emerge, how they are shaped by and themselves shape institutions and how this 
in turn is impacting on the outcomes of the activities of multinationals.   
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In order to emphasise the dynamic interaction between actors, rules and institutions, we 
draw on the metaphor of the ‘game’. One advantage of the game metaphor over Elias’ 
use of the ‘dance’ metaphor is the sense that at the end of the game, there will be 
consequences. Games tend to have distributional outcomes, winners and losers in a way 
which a dance does not. Like the ‘dance’, the processes of a game reflect the skills of 
the participants and these in turn derive from features that are outside the site of the 
game/dance itself. They reflect the resources which are available to actors because of 
their positioning in a wider social structure of institutions. This wider setting imposes a 
certain structuring over the rules by which the actors play the game. However, we 
should not interpret this in an overly deterministic way. There are a variety of 
institutional resources in any particular society for actors to draw on. Nor need actors be 
confined to their local context when searching for resources. Thus these games require 
skill and knowledge and they require this to be put into action in encounters with other 
actors.   
 
The game metaphor has limitations. It encourages us to reify both actors and rules, 
something which in this paper we seek to avoid. We use the category ‘actor’ not to 
describe a prefigured and premoulded agent but rather as referring to an emergent 
grouping composed of shifting interests. Over time, a collective actor can become more 
stable but equally they can remain loose, shifting coalitions of shared interests. This is 
where mutual dependency arises; it is in relation to significant ‘others’ (competing or 
participating in a shared social space) that actors solidify their interests and sense of 
collectivity. They can also remain loosely coupled within themselves depending on how 
the other actor groups with which they are ‘gaming’ are constituting themselves. 
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Similarly rules gain their constraining power and their solidity only as actors refer to 
them and use them as ways to further their own interests at the expense of others. It is 
through the process of interaction that the rules become more clearly identified and 
hard. 
 
Through the game metaphor, we aim to emphasize action, emergence and change as 
central to renewing the institutionalist approach to multinationals. We present four 
“ideal-typical” games that are being played in MNCs in the current period. We have 
chosen these games on the basis of our own research and that of others who have been 
interested in the internal dynamics of MNC. We do not claim that these four are 
exhaustive but that they do capture some of the key issues in our understanding of 
MNCs from an institutionalist perspective. Each game involves a different interaction 
between institutions and actors. Each game also illustrates a different side of 
institutionalist theory. The games are presented deliberately as ‘ideal-types. They offer 
templates against which processes within specific MNCs can be understood. In specific 
MNCs and institutional contexts the actors which are playing these games are 
constructed differently and the configurational processes that they engage in are 
divergent. Nevertheless by identifying the ideal-typical games, we are able to draw on a 
broad range of institutional theory and offer a potential integrating framework. We 
propose that institutional research on MNCs can progress more effectively by 
considering how the games which we have identified play out in particular contexts and 
how they interact to produce distinctive types of outcomes for multinationals, the actors 
within them and the national and local contexts in which subsidiaries are embedded. 
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For our analysis of each ideal-typical game, we use a similar structure. Firstly, we 
identify the key interdependent actors and how they are mutually positioned and 
interacting. Secondly, we consider the institutional resources upon which they draw and 
how this empowers them to play in particular contexts. Thirdly, we aim to identify the 
key characteristics of the game which is being played. Fourthly, we seek to identify the 
broad consequences of the game for the multinational and its broader objectives. Fifthly 
we relate this to a particular theme in institutional theorizing about MNCs.    
 
First Game: A New Language Game on Globalization. 
Our first game is concerned with the mutual constitution of a discourse of globalization 
and a new social actor, which we can broadly label ‘global management’. The game that 
is being played here is one in which other actors (e.g. managers with local knowledge) 
are being positioned as subordinate – their knowledge is constructed as less valuable, as 
archaic, and as conservative. In theoretical terms, we want to argue that this has 
elements of different kinds of institutional isomorphism carried through the language of 
globalization.  
 
Among the contributions that help make sense of this situation Bartlett and Ghoshal’ s 
book (1989) stands out. According to them, MNCs suffered from problems across 
“administrative heritages” as intensified competition and global restructuring proved 
their previous organizational forms inappropriate. The decentralized federation of the 
classic European MNC, which had its comparative advantages in responsiveness to 
national differences, was deficient in capturing global economies of scale and other 
cost-reducing advantages; whereas the centrally coordinated American and Japanese 
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international and global corporations had advantages in cost-efficiency and were able to 
transfer standardized knowledge and procedures from their home-bases, but proved 
deficient in responding to and learning from local circumstances in host markets and 
economies. To stay competitive MNCs would have to combine global efficiency, 
multinational flexibility and worldwide learning and innovation (Ibid, p 137). The 
solution to this triple demand Bartlett and Ghoshal termed the “transnational solution”. 
In the transnational, the HQs role is distant from operational issues. It directs the flow 
and allocation of capital, assigning different roles and responsibilities to different 
subsidiaries, overseeing and creating market-relations between subsidiaries, building a 
culture that serves as the glue of the entire organization and is sustained by HRM 
policies that police recruitment, ideology and careers of managers. Such organizational 
devices as task forces, project teams and committees that bring together managers and 
employees across subsidiaries from different nations are expected to take conflicts off-
line, thereby preventing the transnational from drifting into anarchy. The HQ must 
constantly balance between its entities, encourage adaptation in some places, reduce 
powers in other places; live with ambiguity, overlap and change in management 
responsibilities among its units so that it encourage diversity, dynamic tension and 
thereby an entrepreneurial spirit within and among them.  
 
This argument reflects an emergent game which is currently central to the development 
of MNCs. On the one side is the actually existing diversity of the MNC, what Bartlett 
and Ghoshal label as ‘administrative heritage’ but which institutionalists are more likely 
to describe as the ‘social embeddedness of managerial practices’. On the other side are 
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the global managers whose attention is focused on achieving the benefits of efficiency, 
flexibility and learning that the ‘transnational solution’ offers.  
 
Our argument is that this perspective has provided a whole broad range of actors inside 
and outside the MNC with a new universal language to conceive of corporations 
engaged in worldwide operations. In particular, it enables the identification of a clear 
role for a category of ‘global managers’. This group is constituted as having a 
willingness to accept diversity, tensions, ambiguity and even conflicts as expected and 
legitimate in such corporations. It knows that diversity exists and constructs this as a 
‘good thing’ because through variety, there can be learning and innovation. However, in 
order for this to happen, the transnational solution requires a vision above and beyond 
the local as well as above and beyond structural solutions. Bartlett and Ghoshal state 
that “the task is not to build a sophisticated matrix structure, but to create a ‘matrix in 
the minds of managers’” (Ibid p 212). The focus is on assessing whether individual 
managers possess the right mind-set for the transnational solution. Reinvigorating the 
traditional distinction between cosmopolitans and locals, this enables the identification 
of a new global business elite. Kanter, for example. describes the operation of these 
New Business Cosmopolitans in this way: 
 
“As cosmopolitans spread universal ideas and juggle the requirements of diverse places, 
they manage resistance to change from locals who see their power eroding. 
Cosmopolitans face decentralizing pulls in their own organizations, such as reasons why 
an idea from one place won’t work in another, resentment of world concepts because 
they restrict local identity and options, and legitimate concerns about how well concepts 
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from other places fit local needs. The job of cosmopolitans is to bridge such differences 
and resolve them so that companies can operate efficiently on a global basis. 
Cosmopolitanism is a mindset that finds commonalities across places. And globalization 
in one aspect of business inevitably leads to globalization in others.” (Kanter, 1995, p 
61). 
 
Thus, in figurational terms, the language of the transnational solution serves to 
constitute a global elite or “community of practice” that accepts that the world is 
diverse, engaged in conflicts, full of ambiguity, resistant to change and relativistic. Such 
an ideology fostering the acceptance of and ability to live on if not thrive on ambiguity 
helps constitute the identity of global management through a language of mutual 
recognition, i.e. knowing who is part of this group and who is not. A central part of this 
identity is action. For the global managers, using diversity to create innovation, learning 
and flexibility in an environment of highly competitive product markets requires 
frequent modifications or changes to formal organizational structures and management 
practices. As there is no organization structural solution for the transnational, global 
managers are free and even expected to constantly alter the balances in the firm across 
subsidiaries, between functions, and between layers in the hierarchy.  Internally, the 
transnational solution as a framework for managerial action has played, no doubt, an 
important part in legitimizing and rationalizing the constant re-allocation of funds and 
product-mandates among subsidiaries, streamlining and making lean HQs, etc.. 
 
Global management as a category of actor draws its legitimacy from multiple sources 
beyond the organization. The powerful discourse of globalization itself, the more 
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substantive management education programmes that claim a common management 
knowledge, the management consultancies that expound global solutions are all 
powerful contributors to this emergent reality. Lurking more problematically behind 
these phenomena are the international financial markets where the discourses of 
shareholder value, global competition and management accountability and 
compensation systems join together to reinforce the view that there is one global 
management elite that shares values, practices and systems. From the point of view of 
our analysis of the MNC, therefore, we do not claim that there is an all-powerful global 
management group dominating the firm. Rather it is an emergent construct that gains its 
meaning and efficacy through relational processes of mutual recognition. 
 
In particular, this comes from how this group interacts with its ‘other’ – ‘local 
managers’. Students of MNCs often observe that the central HQ managers explained 
problems by reference to the idea that many subsidiary managers were lacking “a global 
vision for their activities”. In effect, the game is to call into being the category of ‘local 
managers’ and then to show how such local managers need to be educated and/or 
disciplined in order that the transnational solution can work. The category of ‘local 
manager’ only makes sense from this figurational perspective. From an institutional 
social embeddedness perspective, local managers differ significantly from each other 
rather than making a single collectivity. Local managers as a category relate to specific 
institutional conditions of existence. The global-local differentiation elides that 
distinction as it does many other distinctions. Expatriate managers assigned to 
subsidiaries, for example, may see themselves as part of the global management 
structure as may host country nationals aspiring to positions within different parts of the 
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MNC. They may reject the label ‘local managers’. In other contexts, managers in global 
management positions may wish to continue to see themselves as ‘local managers’, as 
fundamentally German or Danish managers. On the other hand, the language of the 
transnational solution potentially leaves other actors without ascribed formal rights and 
with an institutionalized unpredictability of their future rights and obligations. It offers 
global managers a very high degree of maneuverability as they have a legitimate 
rationalization for not being bound by obligations agreed upon in a particular local 
context.  
 
In summary, our first game concerns the play of global managers in contrast to local 
managers. It reflects the discursive emergence of this category of social actor and its 
‘other’ (local managers) and the construction of a figurational process in which global 
managers constitute themselves as the glue that holds the MNC together at the same 
time as they continually restructure and change the firm. Whereas the category of global 
management exerts a powerful isomorphic pull on individuals through its construction 
in management education, management knowledge and the management press, the 
category of local managers is much more complex, lacking an underlying rationale. 
Within this game, it only exists as ‘the other’ though in reality it exists as many others 
with distinctive institutional resources that enable them to challenge global 
management. Thus convergence (a single game, a single category of global 
management) co-exists and interacts with divergence (diverse institutional settings and 
diverse local actors).  
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Second game: Global Capital Markets, MNC restructurings and investment 
bargaining 
 
Our second game focuses on the interaction between the players in the capital markets 
and the top managers of MNCs and the consequences which this has for firm 
restructurings.  
 
Our first group of actors can be identified as what Golding (2001) terms the Institutional 
Equity Nexus established around the global financial markets. These actors are made up 
of investment banks, institutional investors of various kinds and financial and other 
intermediaries (such as lawyers, accountants and management consultants). It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to identify the specific roles that each of these actors have within 
the institutional equity nexus or how this has emerged as a dominant influence in the 
organization of international capital markets (see Fligstein 1990; Froud et al. 2000; 
Lazonick 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Williams 2000). The main point we 
wish to draw out is that each of these actors has an interest in an active and highly liquid 
capital market. Whether their earnings derive from commissions (buying and selling on 
behalf of others), fees (offering advice to clients) or market changes (buying and selling 
on their own account in anticipation of market movements), they require the capital 
markets to be deep and broad. They also require the capital market to deliver up regular 
high returns. They act in these markets in ways which ensure the possibility of such 
high returns, judging entry and exit into the markets and into corporate deals according 
to this criteria. Although actors within the Institutional Equity Nexus pursue their own 
individual paths to achieving returns, e.g. in terms of their investment strategy at the 
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level of particular firms, sectors, countries etc. and their broader portfolio strategy (in 
terms of managing risks across different types of investment and across different time-
scales), there is also a lot of commonality in terms of how they relate to firms and 
markets.  
 
From the point of view of the firms whose shares are being traded, it follows that firms 
try to grow as fast as possible to be grouped among the league of the largest and most 
liquid stocks  whilst at the same time achieving high levels of returns to shareholders. A 
key method for achieving this is to engage in mergers, acquisitions and hostile take-
overs, an outcome which is very favourable for the institutional equity nexus as it opens 
up the possibility of more fees, commissions and gains from share price movements. 
Thus the game between the institutional equity nexus and the senior managers of the 
MNC is set within the parameters of high returns to shareholders sustained and 
disciplined by participation in the capital markets. What these “markets” offer to MNCs 
is access to cheap financial resources by which they can not only finance their debts but 
also speed up their growth. Engaging in these games, however, also implies that HQ 
executives soon discovered that they had a choice between only two alternatives: either 
they could manoeuvre to be positioned in such a way that they could acquire or merge 
with other firms if their shares were highly rated, or, if they were weak and share prices 
low, the MNC might easily fall victim to hostile take-overs.  
 
The crucial mechanism for mediating these pressures lies in the senior managers’ 
abilities to restructure and reorder the firm to reduce costs and increase efficiency and to 
explain and justify these processes in a discourse acceptable to the key players in the 
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institutional equity nexus. For the senior managers of multinationals, in particular, the 
key to this is primarily identified in the development and application of benchmarks for 
performance at various levels and sites of the organization. The benchmark becomes the 
means for senior managers to judge performance across various sites and to leverage 
local managers and employees in to higher levels of performance in order to save their 
jobs.  This process is in turn reinforced by the degree of oversight and monitoring 
exercised by various parts of the institutional equity nexus, which themselves develop 
benchmarks of best practice that could be used to boost or undermine the position of 
companies. This creates a neat self-referential circle as top executives often hire similar 
professionals and consultancy firms to dress up their strategies in tune with the most 
recent fashions, to devise internal bench marking systems and governance procedures in 
order to talk up the price of shares. Further in order for reporting systems to reflect these 
discourses, top executives impose on subsidiaries new bench-marks, new reporting 
procedures and new pressures for them to meet in investment- and head-count 
bargaining. Subsidiaries take these pressures and put them on workers and suppliers so 
that they spread to every corner of the system. Under the names of “investment-
bargaining” or ‘regime shopping’, we can see a game in which HQs play off 
subsidiaries against each other, forcing them to show up with the best benchmarks in 
order to be favored in investments- or head-counts decisions. Mueller et al. (Mueller, 
1996; Mueller and Purcell, 1992) see this game as an efficient way for MNC HQs to 
simultaneously diffuse new work-practices (JIT, lean-production, teams), etc., to escape 
from the risks of empowered labour that follow from such work-practices and finally to 
force unions to accept gradual reductions in quality of industrial relations, wages and 
working conditions. Thus global managers faced with cut-throat competition forced 
 18
local managers to take on increasingly tough targets for performance that frequently 
required workers to make concessions and adopt new forms of work organization and 
flexible arrangements if they wanted to save their jobs.   
 
The game is interesting because it introduces both a novel form of mutual competition 
among subsidiary levels of MNCs and relates measured performance-differences 
directly to political negotiations on the distribution and allocation of capital. As such it 
seems from the outside to carry some traits of fairness and procedural justice as 
subsidiaries’ abilities for continuous improvement, etc. is exchanged for economic 
resources. Relatedly this institutional equity nexus seemed to promise not only its 
players but also individual shareholders “value for money”. It promised to punish self-
seeking executives by imposing “good governance” and in exchange companies that 
played by its rules were given access to cheap financial resources so that they could take 
over companies that were less able to play according to its rules. It was a system that 
elevated CEOs to heroic positions if they engaged in pressurizing actions for change of 
their corporations by engaging in novel strategies and implementing new bench-marks, 
while CEOs demonstrating less activity became punished as if “criminals” by 
decreasing stock-prices. The community of business professionals was on a constant 
search for novel ways to do businesses in the form of excellent entrepreneurs, change 
masters or corporations and discovered “best practices” which could soon be translated 
into standardized formulas that any corporation playing with the City or Wall Street 
needed to adopt. 
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In our view it is difficult to think of a better example of how myths of the institutional 
environment become effectively imposed on the formal structures of companies as is 
generally held by neo-institutionalist organization analysts. Imitating what is considered 
“legitimate” forms of organization is not just a matter of belonging to the “court-circle” 
of the institutional equity nexus, it is a question of survival, as dropping share-prices do 
not just hamper a company’s ability to grow, but rather prepare it for immediate 
extinction by a hostile take-over. Past-performance, seems of little interest; rather the 
here and now and immediate future matters, and for that reason, headquarters must be 
quick in installing the most recently demanded strategies, goals and means, bench-
marks and governance methods in the most efficient way on both subsidiaries, suppliers 
and “human resources”. It can be said that this game in a very effective way leads to 
isomorphism, not only among headquarters, but also in how and by what measures 
subsidiaries and suppliers are assessed.  
 
At least during the 1990s institutional investors, investment banking, fund managers, 
the stock exchange and MNC HQs constituted in Wall Street and the City of London a 
highly complementary system that would lead to mutual gains (amongst this limited 
group of actors) as long as players stuck to the rules of the game and tried to the best of 
their powers to subdue other parts of their networks to this game. Investment-bargaining 
and regime-shopping looked a small price to pay for managers, when alternative costs 
would be possible hostile take-over bids with the eventual loss of personal prestige and 
position. Complaining local managers just demonstrated their lack of understanding of 
the larger pattern of the global game if they complained about strategies that seemed 
utterly irrelevant for their businesses, about bench-marks that gave only bad insights 
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into their performance more generally and about the lack of investment that forced them 
backwards compared to some of their competitors. When they could not reach bench-
marks, ROI or any new indicator on performance engineered within financial centers, 
consultancy firms, business schools or headquarters, this would be labeled as ‘bad 
excuses’ (Bélanger et al. (1999). In turn, this reinforces the elite’s belief in its own 
foresight compared to the lack of understanding and resistance to change demonstrated 
by from local managers, subsidiaries and workers. 
 
Game three: The institutional logic of MNC Corporate Managers 
Our first two games can be read in terms of processes of institutional isomorphism. In 
the first game, this arose from the creation of a discourse of global management. In the 
second game, the emphasis was on the homogenizing effects of the institutional equity 
nexus in the capital markets. Now, however, we start to draw more on the tradition of 
national business systems type institutionalism. In the next two games, we identify the 
factors which disrupt the isomorphic processes and destabilize the multinational. In the 
third game we focus on the internal processes of competition and gaming that occur 
amongst the managers of the MNC as they seek to survive within the context of the 
institutional equity nexus.  
 
The bench-marking, investment-bargaining and regime shopping game of the last 
section reinforces the M-form type of organization placing the managers of operational 
units in a process of mutual competition whilst top executives oversee, audit, and 
control them, holding a grip over capital-allocation and the strategic orientation of the 
corporation. As a number of authors from Sloan onwards (for the most detailed account, 
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see Freeland 2001) have seen, this has the potential to lead to lack of cooperation across 
management positions and all sorts of subversive games in terms of the reshaping and 
reconstruction of information before it passes to higher authorities. Because these top-
executives are generally not able to assess the numbers from the perspective of 
operational knowledge and experience (which they lack), the danger is that decisions 
are taken on the basis of problematic information. Divisional and subsidiary managers 
learn how to make the numbers “come out right” by manipulating the plans they 
submitted to the general office (Ibid:286) and when such a situation occurs an incessant 
war on numbers results with the implementation of new measures and new forms of 
monitoring.  
 
Jackall (1988) is one of the few that has actually ethnographically observed managerial 
behavior in such M-form organizations. He argues that managerial work in these 
organizations is fragmented and short-term and therefore bound to produce failures in 
large numbers. However, usually such organizations do not have strong tracking 
systems that are able to trace and allocate responsibility in a timely and accurate 
fashion. This is significantly affected by the speed and frequency of organizational 
restructurings and other management changes emerging from the effort to placate the 
capital markets. These changes disrupt clear lines of responsibility going from the 
actions of particular managers to consequences in the marketplace and back to an 
impact on the career progression and rewards of particular managers. From the point of 
view of such managers, it is important to make strategic moves that enroll them as 
members in powerful coalitions and do not leave them taking the blame in situations of 
failure. One of the most efficient ways of achieving both is to “outrun their mistakes”. 
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The formula is to engineer fast promotions so that they may be able to allocate the 
blame for their own mistakes on their successors, thus further advancing themselves and 
harming future potential competitors. Those at the top have the right to allocate blame, 
which therefore “falls on unwary and inexperienced underlings”. This is, in Jackall’s 
view, the new form of bureaucratic power and it combines easily with the creation of 
uncertainty. 
 
A good strategy for fast promotion is to play the “numbers game” right. By making 
promises of short-term improvements and short pay-back periods and by manipulating 
their jurisdiction to come up with fast improvements in current bench marks, they may 
simultaneously get promoted and ruin the longer term potential of a business-area or 
unit. This process squeezes short-term results out of the firm at the same time as 
reducing its long-term development capabilities. Senior managers at the headquarters 
reinforce this game because they themselves are at the top actually because they have 
shown great skills at playing this game, and if the rules were changed, they might 
consequently not be the winners and rulers. Moreover with corporations playing the 
game of the institutional equity nexus, top-executives are only to a limited extent able to 
learn from experience. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005), point out that the highest length of 
service amongst top-executives, in the MNC they investigated, was 5 years. , Normally 
a top-executive is only allowed a period of between 18 months to three years to achieve 
a turn-around in corporate performance. This, has drastically reduced the average length 
of time that managers spend in a senior position within many MNCs. It is easy to trace 
the causality behind this: HQ executives will tend to make very favorable promises to 
the institutional equity nexus in the beginning of their period in office. This will 
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probably be accompanied by maximizing the perception that there were problems in the 
previous period, scape-goating previous management and engaging in significant 
restructurings in the early period of office. The outcomes of any significant 
restructuring are likely to unfold in complex ways over different time-scales. Initial 
successes in pushing up the share price through cutting costs or engaging in big 
mergers, acquisitions or divestments are unlikely to be sustained over a longer period. A 
flattening or dipping of the rate of improvement may stimulate a further round of 
restructurings but the cyclical nature of this soon tests the patience of the institutional 
investors. Therefore senior executives are most likely to maximize their reward 
packages early on in their reign in anticipation of forced or ‘voluntary’ exit later in their 
period of office. Building in continuous restructuring may be one way to avoid this as 
frequent mergers and acquisitions or divestments make it difficult to compare 
achievements across official reporting periods, at the same time as providing the pretext 
for a renegotiation of senior management compensation packages. If such a stabilization 
among rulers is not achieved it becomes nearly impossible to predict for lower level 
managers which are the protective coalitions and which are not as new management is 
just as likely to come from outside (complete with its own allies and networks) as it is 
from inside. At all levels of the managerial hierarchy, therefore, surviving and 
prospering in such an environment is highly unpredictable, another factor which will 
persuade many managers, particularly in the headquarters, to continuously scan the 
labour market environment in the hope that new and better opportunities may come 
along. Where headquarters are co-located, e.g. in and around London or New York, the 
result is a very local labour market for ‘global’ managers! 
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It is important to recognize that this game has another dimension that results from 
institutional differences in the nature of management. Differences in managerial careers, 
in the socialization and training of managers, and in the authority-systems within which 
they operate in different countries may influence, neutralize or transform what Jackall 
called the institutional logic of the corporation and provide other than Anglo-Saxon 
national business systems with important comparative differences if not advantages. 
Authority relations differ amongst countries, not least because industrialists and 
managers circumscribed their coming into dominance under industrialization with very 
different ideologies of authority (Bendix, 2001) fighting against a variety of previous 
authority systems (Bendix, 1980). They fought very different social groups in different 
countries and had to win very different wars to gain highly different social spaces on the 
road to broader societal power and dominance (Kristensen, 1997). From this 
perspective, authority-relations do not simply flow downwards from the holders of 
office but rather are ascribed upwards by those over whom authority is exercised. In 
practical terms this means that those who exercise authority must do it with great care 
so that it falls within subordinates “zone of indifference”, where “orders are acceptable 
without conscious questioning” of their legitimacy (Barnard 1968: 167). Change from 
one institutional logic to another must be connected to and legitimated by the old, 
probably creating a hybrid between the imagined/imitated and the old (Guillén, 1994).  
 
The nature of this authority to manage, how it was granted, under what conditions and 
why it is tolerated and legitimate is a very different game in different countries. 
Whereas a German manager needs to be technically competent to oversee the working 
tasks of his/her subordinate in order to be able to exercise his/her job, in the UK, 
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managers rather rely on more general, frequently changing managerial ideas combined 
with the use of inducements (Stewart, et al 1994), while managerial authority is 
fragmented and responsibilities divided between many offices in France to minimize 
“face to face contacts” (Crozier, 1964; Maurice et al 1979).  In terms of class 
background, educational route, career movements within and between firms, etc. etc, 
countries also show highly divergent patterns for socially constructing the “managerial 
class” (Bjyrkeflot, 2000; De Betignes and Evans, 1977). Thus it may be very different 
managers that come into position in different countries and they may have very different 
ways of adapting to the new institutional logic of the corporation.  
 
A crucial aspect here concerns which managers move up to become the senior managers 
of MNCs, what mechanisms they use to do this and how this relates to their national 
origins. From some institutionalist perspectives, this might be seen in terms of the way 
in which individuals legitimize themselves as ‘global managers’ by developing their 
work experience, their educational qualifications and their personal networks beyond 
their home country. However, in reality the process is likely to be much more subtle. In 
their case study, for example, Kristensen and Zeitlin refer to the ‘Danish mafia’ within 
the MNC as a group of individuals that learnt their skills in the Danish context but then 
for various reasons have been sent off to other subsidiaries and from these positions 
have been able to exercise a wide authority within the MNC. This does not lead to them 
discarding their Danish identity but in some respects reinforces it and encourages them 
to retain their links with other members of the ‘mafia’ as a way of talking about and 
resolving common problems. Thus there are collective institutional resources which 
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individuals draw on as they seek to survive and prosper in this frequently changing 
environment of the MNC. 
 
In this third game, therefore, we can see managers at head office and subsidiary levels 
competing against each other but drawing on different institutional resources. On the 
one hand, the game is convergent, making actors play in a specific way but on the other 
hand, the resources they bring into the game differs. 
 
Game four: Subsidiaries as collective players between local and global games. 
This becomes even clearer when we broaden our perspective from the management 
level to the wider level of the ‘industrial community’ (the network of relations which 
link the local subsidiary to its local context where there is a shared ‘community of fate’) 
that exists at the local level. If, we consider how the specific national constitution of 
subsidiary-managers affects behaviour towards a corporation that has adopted the new 
institutional logic which we have described, it is obvious that a whole range of different 
options are possible, dependent on local circumstances. In countries or regions where 
managerial careers are primarily judged in terms of achieving the targets passed on by 
headquarters and managers’ promotion possibilities are decided internally and 
externally by these short-term achievements, then lower level, subsidiary managers are 
likely to act in concert with the numbers game, i.e. to prove that they can manage their 
subsidiary so as to meet shifting fashions in bench marking in the most significant way. 
As these shifts are set in motion it is highly likely that individual subsidiaries that 
simply follow them, will find it problematic for their long term development. In the 
short term, the ability to hit stringent targets may mean that temporarily such 
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subsidiaries may serve as popular recruiting grounds for managers that are being 
promoted to still higher positions. At the other end of the scale, however, are managers 
that are operating in localities or countries that have a tradition of focusing on more 
long-term developmental goals for the firm.. Such managers face a difficult trade-off. If 
they simply follow the new institutional logic they may ruin their personal reputation 
locally or nationally if it gets known that they have played their cards to meet short term 
bench-marks in such a way that they get promoted by harming a local subsidiary. Often, 
at local levels, there does exist a very well-developed “system for tracing responsibility” 
as employees and colleagues within and among firms are narrating the biographies of 
individual managers and creating stories as to their performance; a narration that may 
wind up with the inclusion of a manager in the local “we” or mean exclusion from the 
global “them”. Managers that opt for a local career may simply choose to play in such a 
way that they cultivate their local reputation at the cost of their global career, accepting 
the risk of being fired or degraded by the MNC. 
 
Birkinshaw (1997, 2000, Birkinshaw and Hood 1998) has shown that subsidiaries may 
take on strategies that lead to the extension rather than the narrow exploitation of the 
mandate, which they have been assigned by their HQs. Delany (1998) describes “Boy 
Scout” and “Subversive” strategies, where the latter are always looking for ways to 
develop their local business in new ways. Such strategists may treat the MNC as just 
one arena of many in which they participate. For example, they may evolve strong 
networks and links into international, national and local markets, networks and 
institutions without seeking permission for this from the MNC HO. Indeed their ties 
with these other actors may become more intense and in some ways more significant (at 
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least for the long-term future of the subsidiary) than their ties with the headquarters. 
Reflecting this, Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) shows how a number of current 
subsidiaries in their MNC case study (which had previously been independent firms) 
actively “applied for membership” of the multinational as a way to realize their own 
strategy. Further, they tried – with different degrees of success – to pursue such 
independent strategies after they had achieved this membership. As Kristensen and 
Zeitlin (2001, 2005) points out, whether subsidiaries play their roles in a boy-scout way 
or are more subversively following their own distinctive route is also dependent on how 
far they accept the head office as a legitimate form of authority which can dictate how 
they are to act. Some subsidiary managers simply accept this as legitimate and follow 
orders without complaint (though, of course, employees might be rather less quiescent); 
others may perceive  the MNC more as a gentleman’s agreements among peers where 
negotiation is essential;  some may think of the MNC as a new form of protected home 
market offering stability and potentially room for new expansion; a final group see the 
entire corporation as an ongoing system of competition, where it is always good to 
struggle for enlarging one’s economic and political space inside and outside the firm.  
 
Boy Scout subsidiaries, obviously, echo both the bench-marking, investment-bargaining 
and regime shopping game and help re-enforce the institutional game among corporate 
managers as these two games were described above. Such subsidiary strategies allow 
for this new regime to come to full fruition and can be expected to lead to isomorphic 
outcomes among subsidiaries in different countries. It is difficult, however, for us to see 
that subsidiaries can play these roles in full without gradually loosing their long term 
sustainability. They become more form than content as they gradually undermine their 
 29
endogenous industrial, innovative and entrepreneurial talent and potential. Thus highly 
integrated MNCs (where subsidiaries lack local autonomy) may over time destroy the 
human and social capital they possess. This does not necessarily mean that the 
outcomes for senior managers are self-defeating. If they can manage boy-scout 
subsidiaries in such a way that they can talk up the share price, by showing that their 
targets are achieved and best practice is being transferred (regardless of the 
consequences), then HQs may be able to create continuously situations in which they 
can take over new companies and keep the machine of isomorphic creative self-
destruction running on a still larger scale. 
 
Subversive strategists must pay lip-service to the new institutional game among 
corporate managers and be able to play successfully the bench-marking, investment-
bargaining and regime shopping game. But their methods are different as they mobilize 
and make novel use of their local social institutions, suppliers, labour markets etc.. In 
this way they rather spur national experimentation within National Business Systems to 
the effect that they may deepen comparative advantages and distinct ways of organizing 
employees and making use of skills etc. Their formal structure and how they measure 
performance is not so important to them as their ability to use internal resources and 
external networks in highly entrepreneurial and very unpredictable ways as seen from 
the MNC HQ. Such subsidiaries become increasingly de-coupled from the MNC and 
increasingly tightly coupled to the core attributes of the national business system or 
local industrial district in which they are located as well as to other places around the 
world that possess similar or complementary capabilities.  
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From the more subversive end of the scale, managers are able to play their cards in a 
skilled way if they are able to achieve two objectives. Firstly they need to be able to 
collaborate internally in the subsidiary across different groups. Secondly they need to be  
able to mobilize local and national resources by collaborating with suppliers, unions, 
vocational training and R&D institutions. Both of these conditions, if met successfully, 
can turn local cooperation into favorable outcomes for the MNC in which they are 
located but at the expense of simultaneously distancing themselves from the MNC head 
office (Kristensen and Zeitlin,Ibid: ch 7; Sölvell and Zander, 1998).  As Sölvell and 
Zander (1998) point out, this may also imply that the better performing subsidiaries are 
those that increasingly become tightly integrated with their host-localities and for whom 
ties to the multinational become, if not weaker, then less and less important for directing 
their overall development. Some of them might even wish to be sold to other MNCs or 
to be offered opportunities for management buy-outs, if their ability to collaborate 
locally is hampered by MNC policies (e.g. towards suppliers, in terms of allocating 
R&D and product mandates). Often in such subsidiaries there is a strong sense of what 
it takes to do good business (technologically, in relation to customers, employees, etc) 
and this feel for the “local” game may in many ways run counter to the new institutional 
logic and method of control of the MNC . Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) point to two 
possible local coalitions partners that may actively become engaged in such deliberate 
struggles: employees relating to the firm through integrative bargaining and sub-
contractors able to play in concert with the subsidiaries. Others have rather pointed to 
units and elements of local “innovation systems” and/or the stickyness of regions” 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). 
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The composition of internal and external actors of local subsidiaries thus will vary from 
one country to another. As observed by Raimo Lovio (2003) a Finish subsidiary 
manager that was able to create an internal collaboration with engineers to take on a 
R&D strategy in opposition to the American owners could through them mobilize larger 
engineering communities in other firms and public R&D institutions and in this way 
create unexpected leeways that changed the position of the subsidiary radically. In 
Denmark, on the contrary, skilled workers and the creation of a partnership between 
shop stewards/the convenor opened unexpected channels to make use of local labour 
markets, welfare schemes and training institutions to create very effective policies that 
brought a very marginal subsidiary close to the center of power of the HQ and provided 
it with an important global role (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005, ch 3). Similarly, Belangér 
et al (1999) show how subsidiaries that either have extraordinarily tight relations to 
national customers or possess viable internal capabilities for indigenous innovation are 
less likely to fall victim to (external) pressures from HQs and therefore can protect 
themselves more from the institutional logic of the MNC.   
 
 
One of the great paradoxes that successful subversive subsidiaries discover, when they 
recognize disobedience as a strategy is that they possess more strengths and power than 
is recognized through the ordinary benchmarking- and performance measurement 
systems of the MNC to which they belong. In some cases this has led to attempts to 
institutionalize from the bottom-up novel forms of negotiations, deliberate attempts to 
modify HQ policies concerning transfer prices, budgetary distributions and influence 
the appointment of subsidiary managers. Sometimes it has led to the establishment of 
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new bodies around and as extensions of existing European Work Councils, e.g. in 
Denmark by shop-stewards and convenors (Kristensen, 2003). In other cases it has led 
to the organizing of recurrent meetings between subsidiary managers from different 
local sites among which technological  and competitive strengths can be better assessed 
and become recognized, partly offsetting also the ability of HQ-managers to play these 
managers off against each other. Other sub-unit managers may speculate about ways to 
force HQ managers into negotiations to preempt closure or relocation plans. For 
instance it is quite legitimate and feasible for subsidiary managers to use subcontractors 
or to outsource technological core-competencies. By using this power strategically, 
managers might entirely empty the subsidiary itself of such core competencies though 
through its local knowledge and networks it retains the capability. Head office managers 
on the other hand may fail to understand these local dynamics. They may as a result 
respond in ways that force the MNC to engage in a broad scale of negotiations with a 
locality before decisions can be made.  
 
If subsidiary level managers start to create coalitions against HQ-managers or if 
networks of employees prepare concerted action before EWC-meetings, it is easy to 
imagine that such coalitions can both offset the games of the institutional equity nexus 
and the institutional logic of the corporation and bring down HQs, especially in times 
when it looks weak in the eyes of actors from the institutional equity nexus. Whether 
such sub-level, transnational power coalitions can also invent ways to collaborate or 
communicate more directly with parts of the shareholders are less predictable. But such 
a perspective in any case serves to underline how easy it is to imagine that researchers, 
engineers, skilled workers and line- and staff functions in relation to production will 
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form pockets of opposition to the existing short term culture that has become installed 
in modern MNCs and may in the longer term become grouped together to form novel 
agencies. This might at least reduce the ability for HQs to further institutionalize 
investment bargaining and regime shopping. But it might even create differentiated 
local spaces by which certain professions from all over the globe will seek shelter in 
certain localities, where subversive subsidiaries can create for them a safe harbour and 
at the same make the locality benefit highly from their presence. This would probably 
both serve as reproduction, reinforcement and change of given local production systems 
but also change it and create for it a more independent global reach and reputation. 
 
Such local clusters of transnational social spaces would greatly expand a final type of 
strategizing that can already be observed emerging in local subsidiaries. Many 
subsidiaries have been bought and sold so many times that their experiences have taught 
them that they should always follow a strategy that re-enforces their indigenous 
strengths in such a way that they are ready to be taken over next time by a “better” 
MNC owner. So in every move they make for securing their short-term survival, they 
should try to secure for themselves a better bargaining situation in any future round of 
negotiations with potential foreign owners. Creating highly competitive centers of 
excellence by becoming a transnational professional social space that links both local 
institutional resources into the subsidiary and more international networks of actors 
(within and outside the MNC) working in similar areas is one possible outcome of the 
drive of subsidiaries to position themselves more powerfully for life outside the environ 
of any one particular MNC. Such stable and consistent strategies in the midst of MNCs 
engaged in constant restructuring at the level of formal structure, in official strategies 
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and bench-marks and dominated by reckless managers fighting for promotions might 
create very strong sub-cultures that have the potential to gradually fight for realizing an 
alternative vision of the MNC. 
 
The future figuration of MNCs: concluding thoughts 
 
In this paper, we have described four ideal-typical games that are ongoing in 
multinationals. Whilst it is possible to argue that there are many more games, our 
selection was based on their importance for revealing the inter-connected and inter-
dependent nature of actors and institutions in the construction of MNCs. In particular, 
we aimed to shed light on the complexity of the MNC and the cross-cutting pressures 
for isomorphism and for institutional differentiation. Our first two ideal-typical games 
illustrated strong processes of isomorphism generated through the discourse and 
practice of global management and global capital markets. In these processes, the ‘local’ 
was reduced to either a general category that concealed institutional differences between 
localities or a ‘victim’ of processes of investment bargaining and regime shopping. Our 
second two types of games, however, unpacked the isomorphism processes and revealed 
a much more precarious underpinning to the contemporary model of the MNC. The 
third game revealed how the supposed isomorphic pressures of the capital markets 
potentially created within the MNC a war of all against all. Managers have an interest in 
protecting themselves from the transparency and accountability that the capital markets 
demand. The continuous changes imposed by the markets provide the mechanism for 
this as they allow managers to move quickly around the firm before responsibility can 
definitively land on them. However, this gaming is also affected by the different 
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national conceptions of what it is to be a manager. Thus whilst all managers may be 
playing the game, the way in which they play it and the purposes for which they engage 
in it will differ. This in turn relates to the fourth game where we examined how 
subsidiaries located in distinct institutional contexts develop specific orientations to the 
MNC head quarters. Institutional differences come to the front as key to understanding 
the distinction between Boy Scout subsidiaries and Subversive subsidiaries. The 
following table summarises our four ideal types of games. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
In developing our view of these games, we have treated institutions and actors as 
evolving and changing through processes of interaction. The MNC constitutes a 
particularly powerful transnational social space in this regard. The identification and 
development of actors through confrontations with others that are also struggling over 
social space is strong in MNCs. Unlike firms within national contexts, where the rules 
of power, distribution and authority are relatively well understood, inside the MNC 
there is no obvious institutional structure that holds the system together. This gives the 
space a fluidity that allows for actors to emerge in new ways and compete for social and 
economic rewards that may reshape both actors and institutions. Our four games 
illustrate particular points within the transnational social space of the multinational 
where this interaction is particularly salient. Future studies of particular MNCs using 
this perspective will enable us to see in detail how these games work out in practice. 
Our expectation is that such studies would shift the institutionalist view of MNCs even 
more drastically towards the sort of dynamic perspective which we have presented.  
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In this respect we end with one particular suggestion that stands traditional conceptions 
of multinationals on their head. From our analysis it seems that there is the fascinating 
possibility that the competition between different subsidiaries and different types of 
managers may lead to an outcome where the forces of isomorphism actually undermine 
their own continued existence and the forces of institutional differentiation emerge as 
the more powerful and significant. As the economic potential of boy-scouts gradually is 
exploited and their distinctive assets reduced, if not destroyed, their usefulness for the 
MNC begins to disappear. Conformity provides no long term basis for survival and 
growth.  Subversive strategists, on the other hand, may in the longer term become the 
most important assets for HQ, even to the extent of becoming the exemplars of the 
company’s strategy in front of the institutional equity nexus. For example, in Kristensen 
and Zeitlin (2005) it is the Danish Horsens plant and in Bélanger’s (1999) study of ABB 
it is a small Finnish plant both with a long-term serving manager that move into the 
position of playing the “bench-mark-setting role” after having been greatly neglected by 
the HQs.  
 
When such situations occur, the new language game of globalization that we 
investigated as the first step in this article, may become less rhetoric and more oriented 
towards practice. In such a situation as we have described MNC HQs will loose their 
ability to impose on subsidiaries the bench-marking, investment bargaining and regime-
shopping game. As the subversive subsidiaries hold the key to and secrets of long term 
success, imposing on them targets and processes that destroy their local embeddedness 
and international connectedness would be to destroy again the only assets that give the 
MNC and its shareholders the possibility of long-term growth. As these secrets are 
 37
highly distinct across subsidiaries in different countries, they may not be communicated 
in highly standardized bench-marking systems. Thus HQ executives face in the longer 
term the trade off between loosing power to subsidiaries or giving up the mode of 
control that today brings them their status in the eyes of the institutional equity nexus. In 
such a situation there is a need to alter again the mode of control and accountability, 
offering a historic chance for changing the MNC into a heterarchy and a network 
amongst high performing subsidiaries, with strong elements of self-coordination through 
systems of ongoing negotiations and deliberation. If this form of MNC diffuses on a 
large scale, MNCs may become transnational social spaces in which actors can 
dynamically debate and mutually negotiate the current and future comparative 
advantages of their economic organization and institutional context in the broader global 
division of labour. Today, no doubt, it may be argued that the two first games constitute 
a forceful pattern in which both ideological and social relations reinforce the figuration 
of a MNC so that it is primarily diffusing isomorphic institutions and organizational 
forms universally. But MNCs are fragile and easily changed, apart from being 
constantly challenged by their strongest subsidiaries. If, on the other hand, the first and 
the fourth games combine into feed-back loops of mutual reinforcement, MNCs could 
become the means for the systemic cultivation of comparatively divergent national 
business systems that collaborate innovatively. 
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   Game 1
The language 
game on 
Globalization 
Game 2 
Shareholder 
Value, Global 
Capital 
Markets and 
Firm 
Restructuring
s 
Game 3 
The 
institutional 
logic of MNC 
corporate 
managers 
Game 4 
Subsidiaries 
as collective 
players 
between local 
and global 
games 
The actors Global 
Managers and 
local 
managers 
The 
institutional 
equity nexus 
and senior 
managers in 
the MNC 
Managers in 
various parts 
of the MNC 
‘Industrial 
communities’, 
locally 
embedded 
actors 
The 
institutional 
resources 
The existence 
of global 
firms 
The 
propogation 
of the idea of 
global 
management 
through 
management 
education, 
consulting 
firms, 
financial 
media 
Control over 
capital – an 
interdependen
t relationship 
between 
owners and 
managers – a 
‘governance’ 
issue 
Significantly 
individual 
based – skill 
at playing the 
game but also 
related to the 
ability to 
form 
coalitions 
with others on 
the basis of 
shared 
interests 
Institutional 
resources in 
local systems 
Local 
institutional 
contexts that 
empower 
local actors in 
different ways 
Table 1: The MNC Games in summary 
 
 
that provide 
legitimacy to 
certain 
concepts of 
management 
The game and 
the rules 
How to gain 
authority, 
power and 
legitimacy to 
exercise 
control over 
the MNC as a 
whole 
Playing in the 
capital 
markets 
according to 
the rules of 
power based 
primarily 
around share 
price 
Struggling for 
power and 
position 
within the 
managerial 
hierarchy 
Struggling to 
sustain the 
local 
industrial 
community 
inside or 
outside the 
MNC 
The outcome A 
centralisation 
of authority 
and 
legitimacy to 
the corporate 
headquarters 
of the MNC 
and 
delegitimising 
of local 
differences  
Frequent 
restructurings 
of the MNC 
to respond to 
the market 
Use of regime 
shopping and 
performance 
targets 
Frequent 
changes in 
position, lack 
of 
accountability 
tracking, 
creation of 
‘false 
information,’ 
failure of the 
organization 
to learn 
Diversity of 
subsidiary 
practices and 
orientations; 
balance 
between ‘boy 
scouts’ and 
‘subversives’ 
and impact on 
longer term 
survival of 
the MNC 
The theory Institutional 
isomorphism 
through 
coercive and 
mimetic 
mechanisms 
Coercive 
isomorphism 
derived from 
international 
capital 
markets  
National 
differences 
Power 
conflicts in 
managerial 
hierarchies 
National 
differences 
Institutional 
embeddednes
s of actors. 
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